The Counter-terrorism in Europe 2030, Managing Efficiency and Civil Rights

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Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning
Emerging Technologies and New Counter-Terror Strategies

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The Counter-terrorism in Europe 2030, Managing Efficiency and Civil Rights

1. From a foresight thinking towards an enlightening definition of terrorism

2. Some terrorism data and trends about Europe

3. Counter-terrorism in Europe 2030

Conclusions: and so what?
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Conclusions: and so what?
Foresight thinking

Long Term Vision
Alternatives
Temporality

Collective Intelligence

Complex systems analysis (Cross-disciplinarity)

Project management
Strategic willpower
Action

Transformation

PhD2050, 2014
Narodovoletzi Group from Odessa (1883)

Ph. DESTATTE, 1979, 192-193.
A mythological fascination for duty and death

From Alamut (1938) to Assassin’s Creed (2007-2016)
A mythological fascination for duty and death

‘Nothing is true; everything is permitted’
Deaths by terrorist attacks in Western Europe (1970-2015)

The data for the years 1970-2014 are from the Global Terrorism Data Base (Start). Western Europe is defined as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland en Vatican City.

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/
Terrorism in Western Europe (1970-2016*)

Years of lead
RAF
CCC
ETA
Black September
Killers of Brabant
Action directe
OLP
Br Breivik
Daesh
Attack of a bus of German pilots in Clichy, July 2, 1943

http://d-d.natanson.pagesperso-orange.fr/resistance_juive.htm
The Battle of Algiers, January - Octobre 1957
Definition of terrorism in the Resolution of the UN General Assembly adopted on the 2 February 2000

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes.

Definition of terrorism by the Luxembourg Council of the European Union (2002)

Intentional acts, as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of:

- seriously intimidating a population, or
- unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.
Terrorism is a political project over a period of time that aims to challenge the established order, to try to put a stop to it and/or to substitute a new order for it. To this end, it makes tactical use of transgressive violence, which, however, is presented and regarded as legitimate by the terrorist, in the context of actuality.

(...) many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates. It is worth noting that a categorisation of individuals and terrorist groups based on the ideology or goals they espouse should not be confused with motivating factors and the paths to radicalisation. The underlying causes that lead people to radicalisation and terrorism must be sought in the surroundings (structural factors) and personal interpretations (psychological factors) of the individual.
1. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It is part of a long-time development, from ancient times to nowadays. It should be seen in temporality (relationships between pasts, present and futures).

2. Terrorism is a complex issue that takes many forms and can be used by very different actors, individual or collective, private or public, who are inspired by a political project and hence a strategic determination to take action in order to maintain or transform an existing situation. In defining terrorism, one should avoid conflating it with all forms of political violence and ignoring state-sponsored forms of terrorism.

3. The use of terror and terrorism against citizens is inherent to the political philosophy of our liberal societies as understood by John Locke and Montesquieu in particular.

4. The legitimacy of this political project is subjective; its means are transgressive and intended to be amplified through their psychological impact and media coverage.
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Terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>1077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Terrorist attacks and arrests in EU (2013-2015)


424 arrested in France in 2015, 687 Jihadists arrested (395 in 2014)
Attacks and numbers of arrests of separatist terrorism (2011-2015)

In 2015, Turkish Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups maintained their level of activities in Turkey, as well as in several EU Member States. Militants of the Devrimci Halk Kutrulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C, Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front) carried out a number of attacks in Turkey. In Istanbul in March, a prosecutor was taken hostage and eventually murdered; in August, a firearms attack took place at the US consulate.

DHKP/C sympathisers in European countries continued to provide financial and logistical support to the group in Turkey and to openly praise its terrorist acts, often covering up such activities by using legitimate associations. Financial support came mainly from businesses, the collection of donations, the sale of publications and concerts. In 2015, as in previous years, EU Member States arrested a number of DHKP/C members and investigated financing and propaganda activities. In May, for example, authorities in Germany banned the Yürüyüs magazine used by the DHKP/C for propaganda, funding and recruitment. The ban was also implemented by the Netherlands and Belgium.

The Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist) is another Turkish-based left-wing terrorist group with a presence in the EU. TKP/ML networks in Europe have been reported to provide logistical and financial support to the group. In April 2015, a total of 11 TKP/ML members were arrested in France, Germany, Greece and Switzerland. In November, a German citizen was extradited from France to Germany, in order to be tried on charges of membership of the TKP/ML.

Figure 9: Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorism 2011-2015

Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offenses (2013-2015)

Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired / jihadist terrorism (2011-2015)

Attacks in 2015 per EU Member State and per affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Jihadist</th>
<th>Left-wing</th>
<th>Right-wing</th>
<th>Separatist</th>
<th>Single issue</th>
<th>Not specified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Even if terrorists were more active in the “Years of lead” (1972-1998), one can observe an increasing number of the attacks and casualties in Europe for some years. The present upward trajectory is mostly linked to the development of jihadism in EU Members and to fighters travelling to and from conflict zones, especially Middle-East and North-Africa (MENA). In 2015, six EU Member States reported a total of 211 terrorist attacks including 17 Jihadist attacks resulted in the deaths of 148 people, after two years of very few attacks (TE-SAT 2016, p. 44.).

2. In the long run, the attacks data show that motivation of terrorism in Europe is mostly nationalism and separatism. For some decades, we observe an increasing impact (deaths and media noise) of the Islamic/Jihadist/Salafist terrorism (Abu Musab al-Suri’s Global Islamic Resistance Call, Jan 2005). More and more, self-radicalized individuals or small cells, including “home-grown terrorism” could be inspired without any physical contact with terrorist organizations (LIA, 2007. - SUTALAND & GURBUZ, 2013, p. 79-80). In 2015, Al-Qaeda and IS reitered their appeal for lone actor attacks in western countries (TE-SAT 2016, p. 26 & 30).
An increasing number of Foreign terrorist fighters returning from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq could also be involved in attacks.

3. According to Europol (TE-SAT 2016, p. 29), a larger proportion of women are travelling to Syria and Iraq increasing the risk of involvement in terrorist suicide attacks in the coming years in Europe, as it is used by Boko Haram (IS West Africa since March 2015) at the Nigeria’s border.

4. Some clues, especially after the attempts, show that terrorism acting in the name of Islamism has a real social base of supporters that could expand in the future.

5. The lack of knowledge of the Arabic among Europe's police forces and resulting difficulties in penetrating underground groups of non-European origin are obvious and important concerns. (M. Deflem, 2008, p. 132).

6. In some EU Member States the right-wing / proto-fascist movements increased their activities in relationship with anti-immigration and anti-Islam feelings. Xenophobic offences rose sharply and become more violent even if arrests related to right-wing terrorism offences decreased in 2015. (TE-SAT 2016, p. 41).
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Foresight Blueprint prepared with students (mostly BAC+5) in Paris-Diderot University Foresight Course (Master 3 Pro, Consultancy, Studies and Intervention).

Three countries in comparison with the French situation: the UK, Spain and Germany.

Analysis divided into four phases:

- a systemic approach as a diagnosis of terrorism in Europe since 11 September 2001: environment, structure, activity, purposes, development;
- a retro-foresight approach: identifying processes, bifurcations and alternatives in terrorism and counter-terrorism (2001-2016);
- a foresight approach: identifying processes, bifurcations and alternatives in terrorism and counter-terrorism (2016-2030);
- the identification of issues in the form of questions, with a view to outlining desirable futures and strategies, and considering concrete actions.
Counterterrorism in Europe 2030
Basis trajectory, bifurcations, wildcard and associated alternatives

2001

9/11

WILDCARD

2016

2030
Counterterrorism in Europe 2030
Spain (Foresight)

- 1994: ETA's 820 assassinations since 1968
- 2001: 9/11
- 2003: Abu Musab al-Suri
- 2004: Coalition of the Willing
- 2005: Manifesto de Resistência Galega
- 2006-2010: Increasing European International Intelligence
- 2010: Internal Cooperation Agreement
- 2011: CITCO
- 2014: Money Suppression
- 2016: Nationwide panic by hackers broadcast

Mediterranean Defense Union with France, Morocco, Lybia, Turkey, etc.

Long experience of fight against terrorism with great prudence in order to respect democracy

11-M

Money Suppression

Media Control while assuring legitimate information in democracy

Massive attack on Madrid-Barajas Airport

Spain (Foresight)
Counterterrorism in Europe 2030
UK (Retroforesight)

- 1988: Lockerbie
- 1998: Good Friday Agreement
- 1998: IRA ceasefires + Real IRA Omagh Bombing
- 2000: Failed attacks in London & Glasgow
- 2001: Coalition of the Willing
- 2005: 7 July
- 2005: Coercive Conferences on Human Trafficking
- 2006: Prevention of Terrorism Act
- 2006: ATCS
- 2006: 7 July
- 2011: Terrorism Act
- 2015: Counter-Terrorism and Security Act
- 2030:

The economic crisis of 2007 and the austerity policy accentuate social inequalities and foster a tense social environment. Social inequalities are widening: low income redistribution, rising unemployment (mostly among young people), poverty and insecurity. Dissident Republicans (DR) have some activities in Northern Ireland since 2011.
Counterterrorism in Europe 2030
UK (Foresight)

- 9/11
- Coalition of the Willing
- 7 July 2005: Failed attacks in London & Glasgow
- Air strikes against Daesh (2016)
- 2001: 7 July
- 2003: Good Friday Agreement
- 2005: Prevention of Terrorism Act
- 2006: Terrorism Act
- 2007: TPIMA
- 2011: Counter-Terrorism and Security Act
- 2015: 2015
- 2020: New kind, non anticipated major terror attack
- 2030: EU army and cooperation enhancement
- Ground UK, US and turkish troops in Lybia and Syria
- Brexit: redefining partnerships and counter-terrorism policies

- IRA since 1920
- Real IRA Omagh Bombing
- Lockerbie 1988
Counter-terrorism in Europe 2030
Germany (Retroforesight)

- 1998: Dissolution RAF
- 2001: The Hamburg Al-Qaida Contingent to 9/11
- 2002-2005: Debate about the role of army
- 2006: Security Agreements
- 2008: Law on terrorism financing
- 2015: BFE+
- 2015: Dissolution RAF
- 9/11

Opening to migrants
Repressive counter-terrorism policy in European framework

1 million refugees, many from Syria and Afghanistan
Counter-terrorism in Europe 2030
Germany (Foresight)

- 2001: The Hamburg Al-Qaida Contingent to 9/11
- 2002: Dissolution RAF
- 1998: "Urban Guerrilla"
- 1998: "Chinese Patriot Act"?
- 2005: 9/11
- 2006: Debate about the role of army
- 2008: Law on terrorism financing
- 2015: BFE+
- 2016: CBRN attack Potsdamer Platz
- 2017: 2017
- 2019: Intervention against Daesh in Africa
- 2019: Crisis after overthrow of KSA

Military intervention of EU in Middle East
European military and counter-terrorism integration
Tightening up of the migration policy

Security Agreements
Afghanistan
1 million refugees, many from Syria and Afghanistan
1. How could the institutions of the European Union anticipate the counter-terrorism initiatives and measure that they usually decide as answers after the terrorist actions, knowing that every attack opens the cone of the possible futures?

2. How can the Europeans balance the humanitarian and economic necessities designed to welcome refugees or migrants with the detection and control of the terrorists' flow in order to stop the introduction of CBRN weapons?

3. As we consider that the progress of education is a key point to deal with the terrorism question, how could we really help improving the educational systems both in Europe and in the developing countries?

4. How could we develop a conception of human rights and of democracy which could take different forms according to the different cultures and levels of development of the populations in order to avoid imposing our own models to the entire world?
5. How could the anti-terrorist coalitions destroy the supports of terrorism in the different Middle East and Mediterranean countries without creating more frustrations and desire of revenge nor inspiring new vocations?

6. How could the European society as a whole, including media actors, social networks and political decision makers, engage in a common pact meant to avoid giving publicity and glory to the terrorists who commit crimes?

7. As most of our governments finally engaged in negotiations with most of the terrorists groups that have to fight with, despite the fact that they swear they never discuss with them, on which basis could we open a platform of dialogue with the jihadist groups?
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This last issue has been formulated by young French women and men who have been hardly hurt by terrorism these last years, last months, or last days.

On March 11, 2004, just after the Madrid attack, the Spanish Prime Minister Aznar said "There are no negotiations possible or desirable with these assassins that have so often sown death through all of Spain. We will defeat them. We will succeed in finishing off the terrorist band, with the strength of the rule of law and with the unity of all Spaniards." At that moment, we did not know if the responsables of the attempts were from ETA or al-Qaida. But that’s globally what we all have in mind now.

On the 15 January 2016, answering to the Secretary-General address about terrorism and the willingness to fight against it, Ambassador Michele J. Sison, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations said that this challenge is complex. Violent extremism cannot be eradicated by using only one tool in our toolkit. Countries instead need to consider an “all-of-society” approach, where central government ministries partner with civil
In 2011, Guy Standing described a large part of the adult population (at least a quarter) alienated, anomic, anxious and prone to anger, in political disengagement: the precariat. The professor of Economic-Security wrote that we might be alarmed by the thought that the precariat is a dangerous class. A group that sees no future of security or identity will feel fear and frustration that could lead to its lashing out at identifiable or imagined causes of its lots. And detachment from the mainstream of economic affluence and progress is conducive to intolerance.


Tackling Sherwoodisation could not be the only answer to the risks of terrorism. But that should be one of our major fields of action. In Europe, that idea is not yet sufficiently on the table. One could imagine how it will be difficult to convince the decision-makers to achieve their leadership on such a question and to the citizens to convince their political leaders to follow that path. But, it fact, this seems the only way to separate the terrorists from their social base, as social link seems more important for jihadism than ideology (RAFLIK, 2016, p. 202. – SAGEMAN, 2004).
Thank you!
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